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The (Im)Partial Jury
A TRIAL CONSULTANT’S ROLE IN THE VENIRE
PROCESS
“Jury selection is strictly an emotional process. They’re looking
for people they can manipulate. Both sides are.”1
INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 1995, “more than 150 million viewers”—
accounting for fifty-seven percent of the nation’s population—
turned on their televisions to watch twelve jurors deliver a
verdict.2 The nation fixated on the defendant’s and the victims’
fame, the gruesome nature of the crime, and ultimately, the
unpredictable verdict.3 O.J. Simpson, a former American football
star, was indicted for the murder of his ex-wife and her friend.4
The “televised case . . . transfixed the nation,”5 but at the time,
a woman sitting among Simpson’s “Dream Team”6 was not the
subject of common conversation. She did not speak in open court,
but she has since been recognized as one of Simpson’s “secret

1 In an interview on May 17, 2002, Joseph Wambaugh, an author who writes
about the criminal justice system, was asked about his novel, The Fire Lover. Wambaugh
discussed his concerns about the jury selection process and told the interviewee he
believes “[t]he time has come for professional jurors.” Interview by Ann Bruns, The Book
Report Network, with Joseph Wambaugh, Former Los Angeles Police Dep’t Detective
(May 17, 2002), https://www.bookreporter.com/authors/joseph-wambaugh/news/inter
view-051602 [https://perma.cc/ZR8T-DRH3].
2 Julia Zorthian, How the O.J. Simpson Verdict Changed the Way We All
Watch TV, TIME (Oct. 2, 2015), http://time.com/4059067/oj-simpson-verdict/ [https://
perma.cc/LW7A-W3CG].
3 Id.
4 O.J. Simpson’s ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Ronald Goldman were
stabbed to death and found outside Nicole Brown Simpson’s home. O.J. Simpson Trial:
Where Are They Now?, ABC NEWS (June 12, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/oj-simpsontrial-now/story?id=17377772 [https://perma.cc/BX8J-CM7N].
5 Id.
6 The media coined the term “Dream Team,” referring to the team of lawyers
that represented O.J. Simpson during the criminal trial. Lorraine Adams & Serge F.
Kovaleski, The Best Defense Money Could Buy, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 1995),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/10/08/the-best-defense-moneycould-buy/368091dd-b72a-4d9b-a88d-248e726849ca/?utm_term=.44063450913e [https://
perma.cc/7GBJ-QJJU].
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weapons.”7 Jo-Ellan Dimitrius, the trial consultant working
among O.J. Simpson’s “Dream Team,” offered a psychological
perspective on the case.8
Prior to jury selection, Dimitrius advised the team that
“the perfect juror was a female African American with a high
school education or less.”9 Moreover, she “noted that her pre-trial
research for the case indicated that women over thirty ‘would not
necessarily believe spousal abuse leads to murder’”10 and would
likely be more sympathetic to Simpson. The prosecution’s trial
consultant gathered the same data, but the prosecutor assigned
to Simpson’s case doubted the validity of his findings and fired
him after two days of jury selection.11 After weeks of voir dire,12 ten
women—eight of whom were African American and seven of whom
were over the age of thirty—sat on the twelve-person panel that
acquitted Simpson.13 Dimitrius was “the first person . . . thanked
at [a] victory news conference,”14 but she was also “personally
blamed for letting O.J. walk the streets.”15
Admittedly, many other factors were at play during the
O.J. Simpson trial that led to the verdict, but Dimitrius’s
admission that she focused on age, sex, and race when selecting
a jury raises red flags. Unfortunately, this practice is not
uncommon. In 2017, a trial consultant commented on the tactics
he expected the attorneys for Bill Cosby, an actor-comedian

7 Inside Edition, The Secret Weapon Who Told O.J. Simpson’s Attorneys How to
Pick a Jury, YOUTUBE (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8ce6U3I6nE
[https://perma.cc/73UN-3XJF].
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Rachel Hartje, Comment, A Jury of Your Peers?: How Jury Consulting May
Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve Constitutional Limitations Imposed on the Selection
of Juries, 41 CAL. W.L. REV. 479, 494 (2005) (quoting Stephanie Yarbrough, The Jury
Consultant: Friend or Foe of Justice, 54 SMU L. REV. 1885, 1892 (2001)).
11 “[The prosecutor] had disagreed with her expert’s advice to excuse several
women from the jury, and instead acted on the gender-based hunch that female jurors
would respond well to her courtroom style and identify with her as a woman. She could
not have been more wrong.” Collin P. Wedel, Note, Twelve Angry (and Stereotyped)
Jurors: How Courts Can Use Scientific Jury Selection to End Discriminatory Peremptory
Challenges, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 312 (2011) (footnote omitted).
12 Voir dire is “the act or process of questioning prospective jurors to determine
which are qualified (as by freedom from bias) and suited for service on a jury.” Voir dire,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/voir%20dire [https://
perma.cc/852E-AFPN]; see also Daniel Hatoum, Injustice in Black and White:
Eliminating Prosecutors’ Peremptory Strikes in Interracial Death Penalty Cases, 84
BROOK. L. REV. 165, 168 (2018).
13 Hartje, supra note 10, at 494; see also Inside Edition, supra note 7.
14 Adams & Kovaleski, supra note 6.
15 Matthew Hutson, Unnatural Selection, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 1, 2007),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200703/unnatural-selection [https://perma.cc/V8SK8KGY].
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charged with sexual assault, to employ.16 He predicted that
“[t]he defense [would] likely seek jurors who are black, male,
older and perhaps celebrity worshippers.”17 Instead of focusing
exclusively on the jurors’ personalities or personal experiences,
attorneys and trial consultants sometimes consider immutable
characteristics, such as race, age, and gender.18
The Supreme Court has been actively installing
safeguards into the jury selection process to remove those exact
discriminatory biases because deliberate “prejudice is antithetical
to the functioning of the jury system.”19 In Batson v. Kentucky, the
Supreme Court forbade State prosecutors from challenging
potential jurors solely on account of their race.20 A line of cases
following Batson expanded its holding to apply to a wide array of
unfounded prejudices that may seep into the courtroom.21 To
further restrict discriminatory behavior in the jury system, the
Supreme Court recently held in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado that
jury deliberations are no longer insulated from judicial inquiry if
jurors exhibit racial biases, regardless of whether a verdict had
already been entered.22 Despite the Supreme Court’s decisions
attempting to curtail discrimination in the jury system,23
attorney-conducted voir dire often allows biased jurors to sit on
the panel. To remedy the situation, trial consultants—individuals
often hired specifically to select juries—may be retained to offer
expert services during jury selection.24 Trial consultants are in a
16 Maryclaire Dale & Dake Kang, 3 White Men, 2 White Women 1st Picks for
Bill Cosby Jury, NBC10 (May 22, 2017, 9:18 PM EDT), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/
news/local/QA-Cosby-Jury-A-look-At-What-To-Expect-During-Selection-423439634.html
[https://perma.cc/HZ5J-C89X].
17 Id.
18 Id.; see also Jeff Frederick, Evaluating Potential Jurors, AM. BAR ASS’N (June
28, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/
december_2012/evaluating_potential_jurors/ [https://perma.cc/6Z3N-UJXY].
19 Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017).
20 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (attorneys are prohibited from
striking a juror solely on account of the juror’s race).
21 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (race-based
exclusions are impermissible in the civil context); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416
(1991) (race-based challenges can be made irrespective of the defendant’s race); Georgia
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (criminal defendants, in addition to prosecutors, are
prohibited from excluding jurors on the basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (gender-based exclusions are impermissible).
22 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867 (“The duty to confront racial animus in
the justice system is not the legislature’s alone. Time and again, this Court has been
called upon to enforce the Constitution’s guarantee against state-sponsored racial
discrimination in the jury system.”).
23 See supra notes 19–20; see also Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (the noimpeachment rule does not bar judicial inquiry into racially charged jury deliberations).
24 Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the
Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, to Do
About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441, 452 (1999).
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better position to elicit juror biases, but regardless of Batson and
its progeny, they are free to conduct trial research based on
ageism, sexism, and racism.
This note argues that because trial consultants are
integral members of the jury system, the field of trial consulting
must be significantly more regulated in order to align with the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Batson v. Kentucky and PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado. Part I reviews the implementation of
psychology into the legal system, detailing the origin of the trial
consulting field, the job description of the modern trial consultant,
and the critiques often associated with the profession. This Part
also includes a brief overview of the venire25 process, highlighting
the controversial nature of peremptory challenges. Part II
addresses the evolution of Batson v. Kentucky, holding that
discriminatory biases have no place in the courtroom. This Part
also discusses the recent Supreme Court holding in PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado, further iterating the need to remove
discrimination in the modern jury system but focusing on the
biases of jury members rather than the biases of attorneys. Part
III explores the lack of formal regulations governing the trial
consulting field and the subsequent effects of the profession’s
limitless boundaries. Finally, to address the deliberate
impaneling of an impartial jury, Part IV proposes that trial
consultants should offer services during the jury selection phase
only when appointed by the court rather than by one of the
adversarial parties. Trial consultants can improve the
constitutional fairness of a jury trial, but to combat the
consultants advertising as experts without any formal training—
including those relying solely on unfounded prejudices—this Part
also suggests the creation of a state licensing body.
I.

INFUSING PSYCHOLOGY INTO THE LEGAL SYSTEM

A.

The Origin of Trial Consulting

Scientific jury selection, a sub-category of trial consulting,
dates back to the early 1970s from the infamous case United
States v. Ahmad, better known as the “Harrisburg Seven” trial.26
The government indicted seven individuals who actively opposed
25 The venire is the “panel from which a jury is to be selected.” Venire, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/venire [https://perma.cc/7P7P-UJ5H].
26 See United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972); see also
VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 81 n.3 (1986); Jeremy W. Barber,
Note, The Jury Is Still Out: The Role of Jury Science in the Modern American Courtroom,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1232–33 (1994).
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the Vietnam War “for conspiring to blow up heating tunnels in
Washington, smuggling letters in and out of prison, and various
other counts.”27 Although there were multiple venues where the
case could have been tried, the government brought the
indictment in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a notably conservative
city unlikely to sympathize with the defendants.28 “Jay Schulman,
a . . . sociologist and anti-war activist . . . believed the ‘scales of
justice were by no means balanced in this case.’”29
To balance the scales, Schulman offered to assist the
defense, “introduc[ing] the notion of a partnership between the
social sciences and the law.”30 Typically, the prosecutor and
defense counsel pose questions to a pool of jurors, and based on
prospective jurors’ responses, the attorneys strike the jurors
they believe will be unfair or unsympathetic to their position.31
Schulman doubted the accuracy of a lawyer’s gut instinct and
surveyed the local community to study the correlations between
a person’s demographic and their view on the case.32 Although
“[c]rude pretrial surveys showed an eighty percent likelihood
that a random jury would convict,”33 Schulman narrowed in on
“characteristics of the individual jurors” and “potential group
dynamics” to identify ideal jurors.34 “[T]he jury hung on all of the
most serious charges,” and the verdict is often attributed to the
incorporation of social science in the voir dire process.35
The field of trial consulting was born with the Harrisburg
Seven trial, and now, “‘[i]t’s gotten to the point where if the case
is large enough, it’s almost malpractice not to use [trial

See Barber, supra note 26, at 1232.
Id.
29 Id. (quoting Jay Schulman et al., Recipe for a Jury, in IN THE JURY BOX 13,
16 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987).
30 Id. at 1232–33.
31 For a thorough discussion on attorney-conducted voir dire, including an
overview of the strategies commonly employed by attorneys and the criticisms associated
with those techniques, see Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective
Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1991).
32 Barber, supra note 26, at 1233 (Schulman “interviewed 840 people over the
telephone and followed up with an additional 252 in-depth face-to-face interviews.
Schulman and his associates questioned the respondents about their attitudes towards
such issues as religion, education, books and magazines, government, and war resistance.
They then rated the potential jurors on a scale of desirability from one to five. The defense
then sought to remove the ‘fives’ during voir dire, either for-cause or by using its
peremptory strikes.” (footnotes omitted)).
33 Wedel, supra note 11, at 310.
34 See Barber, supra note 26, at 1233.
35 Id.; see also Homer Bigart, The Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 1972),
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/09/archives/a-strategy-that-backfired-berrigan-case.html
[https://perma.cc/397W-GQDE].
27
28
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consultants].’”36 Despite its inception nearly four decades ago,
there are barely any regulations monitoring the formal
implementation of psychology into this legal proceeding.
B.

An Overview of Trial Consultant Services and its
Critiques

Since the Harrisburg Seven trial, an entire field has
emerged.37 Attorneys now hire trial consultants to
“replace . . . guesses and intuitions about members of the venire
[for] empirical studies that connect expected biases with actual
data about the jury pool.”38 Professional trial consultants are often
“non-lawyers who have acquired their expertise in the social
sciences.”39 Instead of focusing on their client’s legal theory,
consultants offer a psychological perspective by “focus[ing] on the
central issues and recogniz[ing] the differences between the
lawyer’s approach (the ‘legalities’) and the juror’s perspective in
which facts, motives and juror experiences are even more
important than the ‘law’ per se.”40 This perspective, however,
comes with a high price tag. Trial consultants often charge
“$1,000 to $5,000 per day depending on [their professional]
experience.”41 But if services include the creation of a focus group
or a mock trial to analyze the effects of the case on a random pool
of individuals, services can cost as much as $25,000 to $50,000.42
Despite the high price, “[n]o self-respecting trial lawyer will go
through the process of jury selection in an important case without
the assistance of highly paid trial consultants.”43
Trial consulting services often fall into one of four
categories, depending on the stage of litigation: (1) pretrial
research, (2) jury selection, (3) courtroom presentation and
strategy, and (4) post-trial services.44 To gather pretrial
research, the consultant assesses the community from which the
jury will be selected in order “to get a sense of the prevalent
values and views,” often through “community attitude surveys,
36 Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 443 (alteration in original) (quoting
Stephen J. Adler, Litigation Science: Consultants Dope out the Mysteries of Jurors for
Clients Being Sued, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1989, at 1).
37 Barber, supra note 26, at 1234.
38 Id. at 1231.
39 ROBERT L. HAIG, 4 N.Y. PRACTICE SERIES—COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW
YORK STATE COURTS § 37:11 (4th ed. 2017).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 443 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44 Id. at 451–55.
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focus groups, and mock trial simulations.”45 The second category,
jury selection, involves intense scrutiny of prospective and
actual jurors.46 Trial consultants investigate prospective jurors’
backgrounds, craft voir dire questions likely to deliver
unguarded responses, and observe jurors’ candid courtroom
demeanor.47 The goal is to ascertain how the jurors will respond
to the details of the case.48
The third category of trial consulting services, “courtroom
presentation and strategy,” concerns the overall impression that
the lawyers’ case leaves on the jurors.49 Services include “assistance
with opening and closing arguments, witness preparation,
courtroom observation, shadow juries, developing case theory and
presentation, and demonstrative evidence.”50 The last category,
post-trial services, is typically composed of “post-trial juror
interviews.”51 Although the interviews do not affect the trial at
hand, these sessions “provide valuable feedback to the consultants
as to hypothesis-testing and validation or rejection of trial tactics
and strategy.”52 Trial consultants offer an array of services, but
their role during the jury selection process, also known as the
venire process, sparks debate.
The controversy regarding a trial consultant’s role during
the jury selection phase hinges on the field’s effectiveness and
the overall fairness of allowing the practice to exist.53 “[B]oth
lawyers and social scientists . . . have expressed skepticism
regarding the ability of psychologist consultants to be of any real
assistance in winning cases.”54 Many factors are at play during
a trial, such as the evidence presented, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the attorneys’ approaches.55 Indeed, it is
impossible “to isolate the effectiveness” of these factors against
the importance of the jurors selected to serve.56 As one scholar
stated, “Although jury consultants claim high success rates,
45
46
47

at 453–54.

Id. at 452 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 453–54; see Hartje, supra note 10, at 493–94.
See Hartje, supra note 10, at 494; see also Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24,

See Hartje, supra note 10, at 494.
Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 454–55.
50 Id. at 455.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Dennis P. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial
Consultant: An Empirical Investigation, 20 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 142 (1996); see also
Audrey Cleary, Scientific Jury Selection: History, Practice, and Controversy, 28 CONCEPT:
AN INTERDISC. J. OF GRADUATE STUD. 1, 5 (2005) https://concept.journals.villanova.edu/
article/viewFile/255/219 [https://perma.cc/29T9-WGE5].
54 Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 143.
55 See Cleary, supra note 53, at 5.
56 Cleary, supra note 53, at 6.
48

49
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little research has been conducted on the actual effect jury
consultants have in the outcome of a case.”57 Nevertheless, the
field of trial consulting has been “thriv[ing] in the marketplace”
over the last few decades, suggesting that many lawyers trust
that the field is effective.58
Debate also centers on the field’s ethics.59 Critics argue
that consultants diminish the “appearance of justice” and
instead instill an “appearance of manipulation” because they
appear to be tampering with the impartiality of the random
jury.60 Furthermore, because trial consultant services can be
expensive, only select litigants have access: large corporations
and the wealthy.61 It is a tale as old as time that wealthy litigants
are at an advantage,62 but turning a blind eye to imbalances in
the jury selection phase raises serious constitutional concerns,
such as the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. This note
asserts that a trial consultant’s role during the venire process
should be reevaluated.
C.

The Venire Process

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.”63 Jurors are to be randomly selected from “a fair
cross section of the community.”64 To determine which jurors are
See Hartje, supra note 10, at 492.
Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 146.
59 See id. at 147.
60 Hartje, supra note 10, at 502–03. Examples of particularly problematic juror
tampering include the “‘poison pill’ strategy,” by which trial consultants deliberately select
jurors who will hate each other in order to secure a mistrial. See Hartje, supra note 10, at
502–03; see also Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 444 (The trial consultant “deliberately
picked jurors ‘who would explode, who would hate each other. That’s what you want to do in
a criminal case when it is obvious that people are guilty. You go for personalities.’ Then, ‘you
hope the personalities will combust.’” (quoting Christine Evans & Don Van Natta, Jr., The
Verdict on Juries: Only Human, MIAMI HERALD, May 2, 1993, at A1)).
61 See Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 147 (“The argument against trial consulting
typically put forth by journalists is that if the use of a trial consultant can provide a litigant
with an advantage, only large corporations and wealthy individuals will have access to this
high-priced advantage, leaving the average litigant with some form of second-class justice.”).
62 See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649,
650 (2010) (“[L]itigation favors the ‘haves’ over the ‘have-nots.’ . . . [T]he haves, typically
wealthy litigants, are often repeat participants who understand the nuances of litigation;
the have-nots are less wealthy litigants, often ‘one-shotters’ who are much less
sophisticated. In litigation that pairs the haves against the have-nots, the former are more
likely to prevail.” (footnotes omitted)).
63 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
64 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (“It is the policy of the United States that all litigants
in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
57

58
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qualified to sit on a particular case, the prosecution and the
defense question potential jurors, sometimes with the assistance
of a trial consultant, in a process known as voir dire.65
While questioning potential jurors, the prosecution and
the defense have the right to challenge a juror’s candidacy either
by (1) a challenge for cause or (2) a peremptory challenge.66
Litigants are often offered an unlimited number of challenges for
cause, but a specified number of peremptories.67 When exercising
a challenge for cause, “the party must state the specific reason for
the challenge, and the court must find the challenge warranted.”68
A peremptory challenge, on the other hand, is essentially “the
right of a disputant to veto an otherwise qualified juror”69 without
providing a concrete explanation indicating why the candidate is
unfit to serve.70 Despite the peremptory challenge’s longstanding
history in the United States, critics argue that the peremptory
challenge welcomes unconstitutional conduct.71
Because the jury selection stage is just as adversarial as
any other part of a trial,72 instead of exercising peremptory
challenges to remove impartial candidates from the jury, parties
often utilize these challenges as an opportunity to seat a favorable

selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes.”); see also N.Y. CT. R. § 128.6 (McKinney 2018) (“Trial jurors
and grand jurors shall be selected for summoning at random from prospective jurors
previously qualified for service.”).
65 See supra note 12.
66 Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge for Cause against Peremptory
Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 507, 507 (1997); see
also Hatoum, supra note 12, at 169 (“If a juror is unable to objectively weigh the evidence
due to a bias, one of the sides would ask that the juror be struck for ‘cause.’ . . . Peremptory
strikes are discretionary strikes that attorneys use to prevent any potential juror from
serving on the panel, within constitutional limits.” (footnotes omitted)).
67 See Hatoum, supra note 12, at 169 (“Lawyers have an unlimited number of
strikes for cause, provided the lawyer can show a particular bias of a potential juror.”) In
federal court, there is a fixed number of peremptory challenges depending on the type of
case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). In capital cases, “Each side has [twenty] peremptory
challenges.” Id. In other felony cases, “The government has [six] peremptory challenges
and the defendant or defendants jointly have [ten].” Id. In misdemeanor cases, “Each side
has [three] peremptory challenges.” Id. “While the number of challenges for cause is
unlimited, the number of peremptory challenges allowed to each side is usually fixed by
statute.” JAMES J. GOBERT, ET AL., JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF
SELECTING A JURY § 8:2 (2018).
68 Chase & Graffy, supra note 66, at 507–08.
69 Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 814 (1997).
70 Chase & Graffy, supra note 66, at 508.
71 Hoffman, supra note 69, at 835 n.142 (noting various constitutional arguments
against peremptory challenges).
72 Barber, supra note 26, at 1227–28 (“Despite the Sixth Amendment’s edict, the
adversarial climate of our legal system encourages neither defense nor prosecution
attorneys to truly seek an impartial jury. Instead, our system assumes that the adversarial
struggle itself will foster a climate that produces impartial juries.” (footnote omitted)).
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jury that is likely to sympathize with their client.73 That being
said, without having to provide an explanation for the challenge,
“prejudices and biases go largely unchecked,”74 possibly violating
the Fourteenth Amendment.75 A law professor at the University
of Chicago believes “we have captured the worst of two worlds,
creating burdensome, unnecessary and ineffective jury controls at
the front end of the criminal trial while failing to implement badly
needed controls at the back end.”76 To illustrate this point, he
notes, “The Equal Protection Clause77 says in essence, ‘When the
government treats people differently, it has to have a reason.’ The
peremptory challenge says in essence, ‘No, it doesn’t.’”78 One trial
judge, advocating for the complete abolition of peremptory
challenges, asserted that “the very notion of peremptory
challenges is in hopeless conflict with our ideals of what an
impartial jury is and how it should be selected.”79
Modern studies support the notion that peremptory
challenges are often motivated by discriminatory biases. One
study analyzed whether the average capital jury represents the
locale’s population, with regard to race and gender, and whether
the use of peremptory challenges directly affected this
representation.80 Regrettably, the study was “consistent with
many previous studies’ findings indicating that capital jury
selection procedures serve to systematically siphon off women and
African-Americans.”81 Researchers determined that the
“prosecutors’ use of peremptory strikes was motivated by race,
and to a lesser extent, gender.”82 The Equal Justice Initiative, a
non-profit law organization, also reviewed literature and data
73 Chase & Graffy, supra note 66, at 508 (“Indeed, it is now evident that trial
attorneys primarily use peremptory challenges to ‘stack the deck’ and seat a favorable,
rather than an impartial, jury. Attorneys exercise peremptory challenges in order to ‘deselect’ jurors who, while not biased, appear difficult to persuade. These peremptory
challenges . . . are often based on ethnic, religious, cultural, or socioeconomic factors . . . .”).
74 Id.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
76 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (1989).
77 “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78 Alschuler, supra note 76, at 203.
79 Hoffman, supra note 69, at 812. Peremptory challenges lie at the center of
debate “in the academy and in the courts.” Id. at 809. In 1995, a survey of federal trial
judges revealed that “[fifteen] percent of all respondents [preferred] the [complete] abolition
of peremptory challenges . . . . [Nineteen] percent favored some modification of [the]
current rules.” Id. at 810, n.2.
80 Ann M. Eisenberg, Amelia Courtney Hritz, Caisa Elizabeth Royer & John
H. Blume, If It Walks Like Systematic Exclusion and Quacks Like Systematic Exclusion:
Follow-Up on Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury Selection in South
Carolina Capital Cases, 1997–2014, 68 S.C. L. REV. 373, 380–81 (2017).
81 Id. at 388.
82 Id. at 389.
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focusing specifically on the exclusion of qualified racial
minorities.83 They found that “[f]rom 2005 to 2009, in cases where
the death penalty has been imposed, prosecutors in Houston
County, Alabama . . . used peremptory strikes to remove 80% of
the African Americans qualified for jury service.”84 The Supreme
Court addressed the unconstitutionality of this type of conduct in
the mid-1980s in the landmark case, Batson v. Kentucky.85
II.

THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES ABUSE WITHIN THE
COURTROOM

A.

Batson v. Kentucky: Confronting Attorney Biases

In 1986, the Supreme Court delivered an opinion
condemning the use of racially discriminatory peremptories.
After being convicted by an all-white jury, Batson, a black man,
argued that by exercising “peremptory challenges to strike all”
African Americans from the venire, the prosecutor violated
Batson’s constitutional rights.86 The Supreme Court agreed.87
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, addressed
the overarching dangers that arise when the government
dismisses citizens from jury service merely because of their race.88
The Court attributed such practice to be the precise “evil the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure.”89 Allowing
discrimination into the courtroom—the forum credited to the
pursuit of justice—blatantly infringes on the rights of defendants
and jurors, and greatly “undermine[s] public confidence in the
fairness of [the] system.”90 The defendant loses the right to be
tried by a fair cross section of peers.91 Jurors are reduced to
nothing but the color of their skin, despite the fact that “[a]

83 Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, EQUAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 14 (2010) https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discriminationin-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MSK-T9PA].
84 Id.
85 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83–84 (1986).
86 Id. at 83.
87 Id. at 84.
88 Id. at 82, 85–87. In 1880, the Supreme Court addressed many similar concerns
and ultimately held that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). “[T]he Court invalidated a state
statute that provided that only white men could serve as jurors” and “laid the foundation for
the Court’s unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to select
the venire from which individual jurors are drawn.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 88.
89 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
90 Id. at 87.
91 Id. at 86.
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person’s race simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.’”92 And
members of the community doubt that constitutional rights are
actually “secure[d] to all.”93 In an attempt to preserve the integrity
of the judicial system, “enforce[ ] the mandate of equal protection
and further[ ] the ends of justice,”94 the Court adopted a new
standard to apply to all criminal trials.
The Court developed a three-part test to unveil
discrimination masked by peremptory challenges. First, the
defendant must show that he or she belongs to “a cognizable racial
group” and that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
remove other members of that group from the jury.95 The
defendant must establish that the relevant facts and
circumstances suggest that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude potential jurors merely because of their
race.96 Second, “[o]nce the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.”97 As stated by
the Court, “Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some
cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge,
we emphasize that the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to
the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”98 Third, the
trial judge determines whether the defendant has demonstrated
the State removed jurors based on purposeful discrimination.99
The majority’s attempt to modernize peremptory challenges was
a step in the right direction, but Justice Marshall immediately
questioned its applicability in his concurring opinion.
In a famous concurrence, Justice Marshall doubted the
practicality of the majority’s three-part test and, instead, urged
the complete abolition of peremptory challenges.100 Marshall
stated that, “Merely allowing defendants the opportunity to
challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory
92 Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
93 Id. at 87–88.
94 Id. at 99.
95 Id. at 96. The Batson test originally only applied to impermissible
discrimination on account of race, but has since been considerably expanded. See
Hoffman, supra note 69, at 834–35.
96 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
97 Id. at 97.
98 Id. Many critics find that this step “render[s] Batson’s constitutional protections
illusory” because of how easy it is for a prosecutor to “assert facially neutral reasons for striking
a juror.” See, e.g., Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1549 (1990).
99 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
100 Id. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not end the
racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”).
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challenges in individual cases will not end the illegitimate use
of the peremptory challenge.”101 Indeed, the majority’s three-part
test only protects defendants from “flagrant” challenges that
support a finding of “a prima facie case.”102 If a prosecutor strikes
only a few jurors on account of race, the defendant will struggle
to establish the first step of the test.103 Thus, discrimination can
go unremedied so long as prosecutors “hold that discrimination
to an ‘acceptable’ level.”104
Justice Marshall also cast doubt on the second step of the
test. Marshall expounded that a prosecutor can effortlessly assert
a facially neutral reason for striking a juror and it is unlikely trial
courts will question any reasons provided.105 “If such easily
generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor’s
obligation to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory.”106 Although
Justice Marshall “applaud[ed] the Court’s holding,” according to
him, the only way to expose racial biases masked by peremptory
challenges is to ban peremptories entirely.107 The dissenting
justice, on the other hand, opposed the notion in its entirety that
peremptory challenges inspired unjust discrimination.
Justice Rehnquist took a very different approach and found
“simply nothing ‘unequal’ about the State’s using its peremptory
challenges to strike [African Americans] from the jury in cases
involving [African American] defendants.”108 He claimed that his
proposition was supported so long as such use “applie[s] across-theboard to jurors of all races and nationalities.”109 Justice Rehnquist’s
reasoning has been deeply criticized.110 “[G]iven the unfortunate
Id. at 105.
Id.
103 See id.
104 Id. Justice Marshall also addresses the subtle ways that State officials kept
African Americans off juries throughout history. To further his point, he includes statistics
mentioned in several cases. See id. at 103 (citing several cases in which “Black
defendants . . . compile[d] statistics showing the extent of [the] practice”).
105 Id. at 106.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 108.
108 Id. at 137 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 138. His justification was that “[t]he use of group affiliations, such as
age, race, or occupation, as a ‘proxy’ for potential juror partiality, based on the
assumption or belief that members of one group are more likely to favor defendants who
belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State’s
exercise of peremptory challenges.” Id.
110 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (“We reject as well the view that
race-based peremptory challenges survive equal protection scrutiny because members of
all races are subject to like treatment, which is to say that white jurors are subject to the
same risk of peremptory challenges based on race as are all other jurors. The suggestion
that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons is no more
authoritative today than the case which advanced the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). This idea has no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence. It is
101
102
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history of racism in our country, it is naïve to suggest that the
unencumbered use of peremptory challenges will result in equal
discrimination against everyone.”111 Turning a blind eye to the abuse
that goes hand-in-hand with racially motivated peremptory
challenges would permit, and likely invite, invidious discrimination
to enter the courtroom. After the entire opinion was published, the
majority’s test only applied to criminal defendants alleging that the
State used peremptories in a racially discriminatory fashion, but the
test is now triggered in an array of contexts.112
B.

Batson’s Progeny

Since the inception of the Batson test in 1986, courts
expanded its scope considerably. Immediately following the
Batson decision, the test only applied in criminal cases where the
State used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror of the same
race as the defendant. In the early 1990s, however, application of
the test “flourished”113 and now may be employed (1) in civil
proceedings,114 (2) by either the prosecution or the defense,115 (3)
irrespective of the race or gender of the defendant,116 and (4) to
confront discrimination based on race or gender.117
In 1991, the Supreme Court held in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. that the Batson test applies in the civil
context.118 A private litigant’s use of peremptory challenges in
civil cases constitutes state action because it implicates and
requires the assistance of the court.119 Thus, Batson applies with
equal force in civil proceedings and “courts must entertain a

axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all
persons suffer them in equal degree.”); see also Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the
Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 562–63 (1992)
(“In reality, members of minority races would more often be peremptorily excused
because of misperceptions about their qualifications to serve as jurors.”).
111 Bray, supra note 110, at 562–63.
112 See Section II.B.
113 Hoffman, supra note 69, at 835.
114 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
115 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
116 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
117 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
118 “Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a construction worker, was injured in a jobsite
accident . . . . [and] sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence.” Edmonson, 500 U.S. at
616. “Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove
black persons from the prospective jury.” Id. “[T]he [final] jury included 11 white persons and
1 black person.” Id. at 617. When Edmonson requested that the court “require Leesville to
articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two [African American] jurors,” the
Court denied the request, holding that “Batson [did] not apply in civil proceedings.” Id.
119 Id. at 620–21.
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challenge to a private litigant’s racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in a civil trial.”120
The following year, the Supreme Court expanded the
parameters of the Batson test even further in Georgia v.
McCullum.121 The Court held that the Constitution prohibits
defendants from employing discriminatory peremptory challenges,
permitting the State to raise a Batson challenge just as a criminal
defendant would.122 The Court firmly held that “the exercise of a
peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the
juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party.”123
Applying the basic premise that peremptories cannot be
grounded in racial stereotypes, in Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court held that “a criminal defendant may object to race-based
exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges
whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the
same race.”124 The Court unambiguously rejected the State’s
argument that “the race of the objecting defendant constitutes a
relevant precondition for a Batson challenge.”125 The Court
reasoned that “[t]o bar petitioner’s claim because his race differs
from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the
arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and
privilege of jury service.”126
In 1994, the Supreme Court held in J.E.B. v. Alabama that
“gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror
competence and impartiality.”127 The State argued that “gender
Id. at 624, 630.
In Georgia v. McCollum, two white defendants were indicted for “aggravated
assault and simple battery” for allegedly beating two African Americans. Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992). Before voir dire, the State “moved to prohibit
respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.”
Id. at 44–45. “The trial judge denied the State’s motion, holding that [the law does not]
prohibit[ ] criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner.” Id. at 45.
122 Id. at 59.
123 Id.
124 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 399, 402 (1991). “Larry Joe Powers, a white man, was
indicted . . . on two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated
murder.” Id. at 402. “The record [did] not indicate that race was somehow implicated in the
crime or the trial.” Id. at 403. Nevertheless, during voir dire, the State used six out of nine
peremptory challenges to strike African Americans from the prospective jury. Id. Powers
objected each time, requesting that the court compel the prosecutor to provide a raceneutral justification for the challenge, but the trial judge overruled each objection. Id.
125 Id. at 406.
126 Id. at 415.
127 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). On behalf of a
mother, the “State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against
petitioner J.E.B.”. Id. During voir dire, “[t]he State . . . used [nine] of its [ten] peremptory
strikes to remove male jurors.” Id. The petitioner protested the State’s use of peremptory
challenges, arguing that “they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of
gender” and therefore did not follow Batson’s “logic and reasoning.” Id. The court denied
120
121
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discrimination in this country . . . has never reached the level of
discrimination against African-Americans, and therefore gender
discrimination, unlike racial discrimination, is tolerable in the
courtroom.”128 The Court directly rejected this argument and found
that “the similarities between the experiences of racial minorities
and women, in some contexts, overpower those differences.”129 The
opinion highlighted the damaging effects of the State’s argument:
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender,
causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors
who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process.
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated
the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire
proceedings. . . . The community is harmed by the State’s
participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and
the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that statesanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders.130

Ultimately, the Court held that “[f]ailing to provide jurors the
same protection against gender discrimination as race
discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson,”131 and
expanded the Batson test to apply to peremptories grounded in
gender discrimination.132 The Supreme Court articulated the
flexibility of Batson but has only formally addressed racial and
gender discrimination.133
In the decade following Batson, the Supreme Court
stretched the doctrine’s confines significantly, but in 1994
missed the opportunity to bar peremptory challenges
discriminating against religion and other classifications
ordinarily subjected to heightened scrutiny. Edward Lee Davis,
an African American, was indicted for aggravated robbery.134
The State exercised a peremptory challenge to strike an African
the objection on the grounds that Batson did not protect gender-based challenges and
“empaneled [an] all-female jury.” Id.
128 Id. at 135 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
129 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
We need not determine, however, whether women or racial minorities have
suffered more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of
our Nation’s history. It is necessary only to acknowledge that ‘our Nation has had
a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,’ a history which warrants
the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based classifications today.
Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 140 (citations omitted).
131 Id. at 145.
132 Id. at 146; see also Wedel, supra note 11, at 302.
133 See Wedel, supra note 11, at 302 (“[C]ourts permit lawyers to excuse a
potential juror because of her religion, astrological sign, or even smile as long as doing so
does not subject her to racial or gender discrimination.”).
134 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2120 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
denying cert. to State v. Davis 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
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American man from the venire and Davis “objected on Batson
grounds.”135 “The prosecutor responded that she had struck the
venireman because he was a Jehovah’s Witness and explained
that ‘[i]n my experience Jahovah Witness [sic] are reluctant to
exercise authority over their fellow human beings in this Court
House.’”136 The prosecutor admitted that she used her challenge
solely because of a religious stereotype she believed in.
Nevertheless, the trial judge accepted the explanation.137 The
Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition for a
writ of certiorari, but Justice Thomas filed a dissenting
opinion.138 Applying the logic of Batson and J.E.B., Justice
Thomas questioned why a Batson challenge does not apply to all
classifications that merit heightened scrutiny, including
religion.139 The Supreme Court has yet to address this
inconsistency, but the law of many states now prohibit
peremptory strikes grounded in discrimination against
classifications accorded heightened scrutiny.140
C.

Batson’s Influence on Trial Consulting Services

Batson and its progeny limit lawyers from employing
discriminatory peremptory challenges, but the Supreme Court
has not addressed the impact of these holdings on the trial
consulting field. Specifically, it is unclear whether a lawyer would
be compelled to disclose research performed by trial consultants
if an opposing party raises a Batson challenge.141 To rebut the
Id. at 2120–21.
Id. at 2121 (errors in original) (citing State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768
(Minn. 1993)).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 2120.
139 Id. at 2121. Judicial review refers to the duty of the judiciary “to decide whether
a law conflict[s] with the Constitution.” Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the
(Heightened, Intermediate, or Strict) Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All
Rights and Powers Are Created Equal, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 421, 426 (2009) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177–78 (1803)). Strict scrutiny and intermediate
scrutiny are types of “heightened review.” Id. at 432. Strict scrutiny requires that the
classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. To pass
intermediate scrutiny, “the government must put forth an important interest (end) and
show that the law at least bears a substantial relation to that interest (means).” Id. at 434.
140 State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (“Batson and
J.E.B. . . . prohibit the use of peremptory strikes based upon one’s religious affiliation
but not based upon one’s relevant opinions, although such opinions may have a religious
foundation.”); State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1147 (N.J. 2004) (“To turn a blind eye to
the discriminatory impact of peremptory challenges exercised on religious grounds would
leave trial courts unequipped to scrutinize prosecutors’ explanations for pretext.”);
People v. Langston, 641 N.Y.S.2d 513, 513–14 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (Batson applied when
peremptory challenge excluded juror because of his Islamic religion).
141 Allan D. Krezminski, Peremptory Challenges After Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete, 65 WIS. LAW. 19, 50 (1992).
135
136
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Batson challenge, the lawyer may seek to rely on the evidence
gathered from its consultant. The lawyer will argue that there
was no prejudicial influence because the lawyer simply followed
the results produced by the consultant’s research. Introducing
this type of evidence, however, raises two issues. First, counsel
has an ethical duty not to disclose a client’s confidential
communications.142 Second, work product—including research
performed by consultants—detailing trial preparation and
strategy enjoys certain protections.143
Although these questions remain unanswered, the logic
and reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s holdings in Batson and
the cases broadening Batson suggest a strong intolerance of bias as
a reason to challenge a juror. If the data gathered from the trial
consultant is rooted in prejudice, the lawyers relying on client
confidentiality or work product protection are taking advantage of
longstanding ethical rules. Indeed, using ethical rules to mask
unethical conduct undermines the rules’ entire spirit.144 Recently,
in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court expressed its
willingness to expose discriminatory biases, even if doing so
compromises seemingly inflexible courtroom procedure.
D.

Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: Exposing Jurors’ Biases

In 2017, the Supreme Court took a radical departure
from precedent to further restrict biases within the jury
system. Batson and its progeny focused on removing a litigant’s
biases when selecting a jury,145 but Peña-Rodriguez targeted

142 Rule 1.6 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits counsel
from “reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure” falls into an enumerated exception. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_6_
confidentiality_of_information/ [https://perma.cc/3CP2-82VA].
143 “[T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s course of
preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of
legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish
adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order.” Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947).
144 This type of conduct directly conflicts with Rule 8.4(g) of the Model Rules
(defining misconduct as “engag[ing] in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law”). MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
145 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (attorneys are prohibited
from striking a juror solely on account of the juror’s race).
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the actual jurors.146 By holding that jury deliberations may be
subject to judicial review if there is evidence of biases,147 the
Supreme Court has narrowed in on another critical part of the
jury system: the jury itself.
This case arose after a jury convicted a Hispanic
defendant.148 Although all jurors confirmed that they could be
impartial,149 it was immediately brought to the court’s attention
that this was not the case. Peña-Rodriguez’s attorney spoke with
several jurors after the trial and “two jurors remained to speak
with counsel in private.”150 The two jurors informed counsel that
one of the other jurors “expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward [the
defendant] and [the] alibi-witness.”151 Specifically, the juror
stated that “Mexican men . . . believe they could do whatever they
wanted with women.”152 Among other anti-Hispanic statements,
the juror explicitly said, “I think he did it because he’s Mexican.”153
Counsel informed the court and obtained sworn affidavits from
the two jurors.154 Nevertheless, the court denied the motion for a
new trial, reasoning that the juror deliberations were protected

146 See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (the noimpeachment rule does not bar judicial inquiry into racially charged jury deliberations).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 863.
149 During voir dire, the judge and the attorneys “repeatedly asked whether [the
prospective jurors] believed that they could be fair and impartial in the case.” Id. at 861.
The court distributed “[a] written questionnaire, ask[ing] if there was ‘anything about you
that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror.’ . . . None of the empaneled
jurors expressed any reservations,” doubts or hesitations before or during the trial. Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.

According to the two jurors, [the juror] told the other jurors that he “believed the
defendant was guilty because, in [his] experience as an ex-law enforcement
officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do
whatever they wanted with women.” The jurors reported that [the juror] stated
his belief that Mexican men are physically controlling of women because of their
sense of entitlement, and further stated, “I think he did it because he’s Mexican
and Mexican men take whatever they want.” According to the jurors, [he] further
explained that, in his experience, “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty
of being aggressive toward women and young girls.” Finally, the jurors recounted
that [he] said that he did not find petitioner’s alibi witness credible because,
among other things, the witness was “an illegal.” (In fact, the witness testified
during trial that he was a legal resident of the United States.).
Id. at 862 (internal citations omitted).
152 Id. at 862.
153 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 Id. at 861–62.
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from inquiry under the Colorado Rule of Evidence155 and “its
federal counterpart.”156
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[d]uring an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred
during the jury’s deliberations.”157 This rule, also known as the
no-impeachment rule, has the ability to mask discriminatory
biases, raising similar problems associated with peremptory
challenges.158 A primary objective of the no-impeachment rule is
“to give substantial protection to verdict finality and to assure
jurors that, once their verdict has been entered, it will not later
be called into question based on the comments or conclusions
they expressed during deliberations.”159 The rule “promotes full
and vigorous discussion” and “gives stability and finality to
verdicts.”160 Although there are well-founded reasons behind
adopting the rule, there are also compelling reasons to relax it.
One such reason is that by providing such rigid insulation
over the deliberation, the no-impeachment rule encourages jury
verdicts to survive even in situations that appear to infringe on a
defendant’s right to a fair trial. For example, in 1987, the
Supreme Court allowed a jury verdict to stand even though jurors
were under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and, consequently,
“sleep[ing] through the afternoons”161 while the trial was in
session. Two jurors informed counsel that jurors were consuming
alcohol, smoking marijuana, and ingesting cocaine during the
trial’s lunch breaks.162 The District Court concluded that the
jurors’ testimony was inadmissible under the no-impeachment
rule and denied the defendant an evidentiary hearing at which
155 Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606(b) (West 2017) (“Upon an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.”).
156 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
157 FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).

[T]hree exceptions to this general exclusionary rule are listed in the text of the rule.
The exceptions provide that jurors may testify about: (A) “extraneous prejudicial
information” improperly brought to their attention, (B) “outside influences”
improperly brought to bear on any juror and (C) a mistake on the verdict form.
Terrence W. McCarthy & Callie D. Brister, The Newly-Created Racial Bias Exception to
the General Rule That Precludes Jurors from Offering Testimony to Impeach Their Own
Verdict, 78 ALA. LAW. 284, 286 (2017) (citing FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)).
158 See supra Section I.C.
159 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
160 Id. at 865.
161 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 113, 127 (1987).
162 Id. at 113, 115.
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the jurors would testify about the misconduct.163 The Supreme
Court affirmed because there are “long-recognized and very
substantial concerns support[ing] the protection of jury
deliberations from intrusive inquiry.”164 Diverting from precedent,
however, the Supreme Court developed an exception to the noimpeachment rule in Peña-Rodriguez to keep a tight rein on racial
biases infiltrating the courtroom.
In Peña-Rodriguez, the Court acknowledged that the
behavior in Tanner was “troubling and unacceptable,” but
distinguished the two cases.165 The Court justified the holding in
Tanner because addressing all “irregularit[ies]” in the jury
system would “expose it to unrelenting scrutiny,” acknowledging
some of the advantages of the no-impeachment rule.166
Nevertheless, “[t]he same cannot be said about racial bias, a
familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk
systematic injury to the administration of justice.”167 The
Supreme Court yet again stressed the need to rid racial
discrimination from the courtroom.
The Court made it clear, however, that “[n]ot every
offhand comment” stemming from racial prejudice removes “the
no-impeachment bar.”168 To overcome the no-impeachment rule
and allow for further judicial inquiry, there are a few hurdles to
jump. First, “there must be a showing that one or more jurors
made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations
and resulting verdict.”169 Second, these statements “must tend to
show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in
the juror’s vote to convict.”170 It is then within the trial court’s
discretion to determine whether the threshold has been met, but
“[w]hen jurors disclose an instance of racial bias as serious as
the one involved in [Peña-Rodriguez], the law must not wholly
disregard its occurrence.”171
The Peña-Rodriguez court only harped on the need to rid
racial discrimination from entering the courtroom. Although this
holding is a step in the right direction, all unfounded prejudices
should be grounds for an evidentiary hearing if the bias “cast[s]
serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 113, 116.
Id. at 127; see also McCarthy & Brister, supra note 157, at 287.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869–70.

692

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

deliberations and resulting verdict.”172 Indeed, in his dissenting
opinion, Justice Alito addressed this “sort of hierarchy of
partiality or bias”173 the majority appears to embrace:
Imagine two cellmates serving lengthy prison terms. Both were convicted
for homicides committed in unrelated barroom fights. At the trial of the
first prisoner, a juror, during deliberations, expressed animosity toward
the defendant because of his race. At the trial of the second prisoner, a
juror, during deliberations, expressed animosity toward the defendant
because he was wearing the jersey of a hated football team. In both cases,
jurors come forward after the trial and reveal what the biased juror said
in the jury room. The Court would say to the first prisoner: “You are
entitled to introduce the jurors’ testimony, because racial bias is
damaging to our society.” To the second, the Court would say: “Even if
you did not have an impartial jury, you must stay in prison because sports
rivalries are not a major societal issue.”174

The evolution of Peña-Rodriguez will hopefully follow Batson’s
footsteps: applying first to a limited circumstance grounded in
racial bias and eventually expanding to a wider array of biases
in a wider array of circumstances.175
The jurors’ biases in Peña-Rodriguez only came to light
because two jurors felt compelled to inform the court.176 The
jurors easily could have remained silent. This raises another
fundamental issue with the jury selection process: are lawyers
able to successfully elicit the biases of potential jurors?
The effectiveness of attorney-conducted voir dire must be
questioned when overtly biased jurors are still being selected to
sit on the jury, even after being questioned by the lawyers. The
outcome of a case relies on the jury selected.177 That said, in 2016,
the National Registry of Exonerations named 1,900 defendants
in the United States convicted of crimes they did not commit.178
Forty-seven percent of these defendants were African
American.179 One explanation for this staggering statistic is the
“defense attorneys’ lack of resources to pay for expert

Id. at 869.
Id. at 883 (Alito, J. dissenting).
174 Id.
175 See supra Section II.B. Although it should be recognized that the Supreme
Court has expanded Batson to target select biases, “many classes of people are stereotyped
and discriminated against.” Wedel, supra note 11, at 307 (emphasis added).
176 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
177 See, e.g., Steven C. Serio, Comment, A Process Right Due? Examining
Whether a Capital Defendant Has a Due Process Right to a Jury Selection Expert, 53 AM.
U. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2004) (“Many scholars believe that most capital cases are won or
lost during jury selection.”).
178 SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL. RACE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS].
179 Id.
172

173
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services.”180 Lawyers often rely on gut instincts when selecting a
jury and critics question their techniques.181 Unlike lawyers,
many trial consultants are specifically trained to evaluate a
broader scope of potentially influential factors that may indicate
the presence of bias.182 Thus, hiring a trial consultant during the
jury selection phase could elicit juror biases that would have
otherwise gone undetected.
Every defendant should be entitled to a fair jury, but the
stakes are raised for capital defendants.183 The American Bar
Association strongly urges defense counsel representing capital
defendants to “seek[ ] expert assistance in the jury selection
process.”184 If for some reason counsel does not retain a trial
consultant, he should nevertheless be familiar with strategies:
(1) for exposing those prospective jurors who would automatically
impose the death penalty following a murder conviction or finding that
the defendant is death-eligible, regardless of the individual
circumstances of the case; (2) for uncovering those prospective jurors
who are unable to give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence;
and (3) for rehabilitating potential jurors whose initial indications of
opposition to the death penalty make them possibly excludable.185

Although the American Bar Association notes that counsel should
be familiar with these techniques, it is unclear how lawyers can
master them. Thus, “[t]he challenge of capital cases has lawyers
turning increasingly to consultants.”186 Although there is an
expectation that consultants are experts in jury selection, the
field’s lack of regulations raises serious concerns.
III.

LIMITLESS BOUNDARIES FOR TRIAL CONSULTANTS

A trial consultant’s advice can be as critical as the
presentation of a case by the attorney or the conversation among
jurors during deliberation. A trial consultant’s use of
discriminatory biases can be just as destructive as an attorney’s
Serio, supra note 177, at 1144.
Id. at 1175–76; see also Hastie, supra note 31, at 708 (an observational study
analyzing twenty-three jury trials led the researcher to determine “voir dire procedures
[were] . . . ‘grossly ineffective’ in separating favorable from unfavorable jurors”).
182 Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 445.
183 “[S]takes are . . . high[ ] ” because “it is not the defendant’s liberty, but his or
her very life on the line.” Hatoum, supra note 12, at 185–86.
184 Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1049 (2003).
185 Id.
186 James V. Grimaldi, ‘Runaway Jury’ Aside, Consultants Are a Fact of Life in
Courtrooms, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/
2003/10/20/runaway-jury-aside-consultants-are-a-fact-of-life-in-courtrooms/40852e5d-f667-4
1b5-8039-2ae73954350f/?utm_term=.2d6b72e9f2d6 [https://perma.cc/G7T8-L6DH].
180
181
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or a juror’s, but the safeguards installed by the Supreme Court
do not directly affect trial consultant conduct like they affect
attorney or juror conduct. The Supreme Court has not addressed
the field’s limitations and the states have not created formal
licensing bodies.187 Relying on social sciences during trial
preparation and practice adds a new dimension to the case, but
the field of trial consulting is barely regulated.188
A.

The Lack of Entry Requirements

There are minimal qualifications to become a trial
consultant. “The incidence of professional incompetence increases
when, as with trial consultants, the field of practice has no entry
requirements or monitoring.”189 Trial consultants are not required
to undergo any formal training. Indeed, consultants come from an
assortment of fields “with backgrounds in clinical psychology and
the other social sciences (e.g., sociology and anthropology), as well
as those with backgrounds in law, communications, marketing,
business, sales, education, military, law enforcement,
handwriting analysis, astrology, phrenology, and tea leaves. In
short, anyone can be a trial consultant or jury consultant.”190 The
concern, however, is not that many consultants have diverse
academic backgrounds. The concern is that virtually anyone can
advertise as a trial consultant, even though a consultant’s advice
can have very powerful effects.191 Trial consultants are often
offering services when their clients have a lot at stake, whether it
be their freedom or a high sum of money, and clients deserve a
sense of security that the consultant is competent to provide the
rendered service. The current system allows an individual to be
hired as a trial consultant, without any proof of competency.
The lack of a state licensing procedure clashes with the
fact that “many professions applying principles from academics,
including law and psychology, are closely regulated to protect
public interests.”192 Without a state licensing body, consultants do
not have to demonstrate that they fully understand the law in the
jurisdiction they plan to practice in or the psychological principles
necessary to expose a juror’s bias. The fields of law and

See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 488–89.
See id. at 488–89.
189 Id. at 488.
190 Joy Stapp, Trial Consultant PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA (Am. Psychol. Ass’n Sci.
Directorate, D.C.), Jan./Feb. 1996, http://www.apa.org/careers/resources/profiles/stapp.aspx
[https://perma.cc/63GF-FRSV] (emphasis added).
191 Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 489.
192 Cleary, supra note 53, at 10; see also Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 488–89.
187

188
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psychology are both highly regulated, so it logically follows that
a profession blending both fields should be regulated as well.193
The birth of trial consulting was only a few decades ago,
yet the field has transformed into a booming business. The
current regime, however, is unrestricted and unstructured.
Standards must be established to set the limits. State
regulations should account for the level of skill required to
register and advertise as a trial consultant. They should also
include ethical guidelines that evolve with time. Recently, for
example, the Internet sparked new changes in the trial
consulting field that must be immediately addressed.
B.

The Internet’s Influence on the Venire Process

The field of trial consulting needs judicial or legislative
guidance regarding the degree to which consultants can
investigate jurors on the internet. The American Bar Association
issued a formal opinion on April 24, 2014, allowing litigants to run
internet searches on prospective jurors.194 Despite the ABA’s
approval, individual judges define the scope of review of a
potential juror’s online presence.195 For example, in 2016, a United
States District Judge presiding over the case between Google and
Oracle gave the litigants “the choice between agreeing to a ban on
conducting Internet and social media research on jurors until trial
concluded or agreeing to disclose details as to the scope of their
intended online research.”196 The judge ultimately decided to ban
Internet searches because “it must pain [trial judges] to
contemplate that, in addition to the sacrifice jurors make for our
country, they must suffer trial lawyers and jury consultants
scouring over their Facebook and other profiles to dissect their

193 See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 488–89 (“If the experience of
professionals in the related fields of law and psychology were a reliable barometer, the
eventual state licensing of trial consultants would seem inevitable.”).
194 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’ l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014)
(“Unless limited by law or court order, a lawyer may review a juror’s or potential juror’s
Internet presence, which may include postings by the juror or potential juror in advance
of and during a trial.”).
195 “‘[E]ach judge in state and federal court may set different rules, because judges
are typically accorded broad discretion in setting proper courtroom behavior, including the
examination of jurors.’” Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of
Investigating Jurors Online, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597, 610–11 (2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting Duncan Stark, Juror Investigation: Is In-Courtroom Internet Research
Going Too Far?, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 93, 96 (2011)).
196 Joseph C. Orlet & Mark A. Pratzel, Social Media and Jury Selection,
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eff05461-18a34168-8a0e-13197b211f35 [https://perma.cc/BH6Q-9GCZ].
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politics, religion, relationships, preferences, friends, photographs
and other personal information.”197
Permitting internet research of jurors has unearthed an
abundance of information, thus changing the entire voir dire
landscape.198 In 2008, one jury consultant commented on how the
Internet—which has since evolved exponentially199—influences
his job.200 “In the age of MySpace, Facebook, cyberspace sales
pitches and blogging, the Internet is proving a treasure trove of
insight into the thinking and values of those called for jury
duty.”201 This “treasure trove of insight,” however, opens the door
for misconduct that has been recognized in many different
contexts, including, for example, the employment sector.
Employers may not ask a prospective employee about his
“religion, sexual preference, or political affiliation,” but it is no
secret that employers “use social media to filter out job applicants
based on their beliefs, looks, and habits.”202 Similarly, trial
consultants can scan the internet for information that makes the
prospective juror sympathetic towards their client, or biased
against opposing counsel’s arguments, without ever addressing
these matters in court. Then, if the juror’s online profile does not
align with the trial consultant’s “ideal juror,” the attorney can
strike the juror from the panel using a peremptory challenge.
Statutory guidance is much needed to assess the appropriate
parameters of prospective juror internet searches. As it currently
stands, trial consultants and attorneys have significant leeway to
conduct as much research as they feel is sufficient.203 In fact, the New
197 Order Re Internet and Social Media Searches of Jurors at 1, Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Google Inc., No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2016), ECF No. 1573 https://s3.
amazonaws.com/pacer-documents/27/231846/035114016886.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CKL-PPLS].
198 Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? May Want to Edit Online Profile, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/29/nation/na-jury29 [https://perma.cc/
N8LX-ZYKU].
199 Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH.
REV., (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cantkeep-pace-with-technology/ [https://perma.cc/Z3CB-ZEKC].
200 Williams, supra note 198.
201 Id.
202 Wadhwa, supra note 199; see also Press Release, CareerBuilder, Number of
Employers Using Social Media to Screen Candidates at All-Time High, Finds Latest
CareerBuilder Study (June 15, 2017), http://press.careerbuilder.com/2017-06-15-Numberof-Employers-Using-Social-Media-to-Screen-Candidates-at-All-Time-High-Finds-LatestCareerBuilder-Study [https://perma.cc/7D4W-ZU6K] (“[Seventy] percent of employers use
social media to screen [employees],” with “more than half [finding] content on social media
that caused them not to hire a candidate.” Common reasons include candidates posting
provocative or inappropriate photographs, videos or information, and commenting about
alcohol or drug use).
203 Despite this leeway, one important limitation is that “all of the committees and
associations that have commented on the issue noted that attorneys cannot evade the ethics
rules simply by having a non-attorney with a name unrecognizable to the juror initiate
communication, as this would violate rules prohibiting deception and misrepresentation, as
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York City Bar Association suggests it may be an ethical violation not
to conduct this type of research.204 While limited internet searches of
potential jurors may prove to be quite useful, it is not hard to
imagine how this practice could be abused, particularly when only
one party has the resources to hire a trial consultant.
C.

An Unleveled Playing Field: When Only One Party Can
Afford a Consultant

No federal or state statutes govern when a litigant may
hire a trial consultant, so constitutional and ethical concerns
arise when only one party can afford a consultant during the jury
selection phase. “[I]t is presumed each side will eliminate those
prospective jurors most favorable to the other side and that the
end result will be an impartial jury.”205 Alternatively, even if
both litigants hire professional trial consultants to find the most
sympathetic jurors to their position, the end result should still
be an impartial jury. “Yet [both scenarios] assume[ ] equal
resources and skills for the two sides.”206 As mentioned earlier,
however, trial consulting services are expensive and have been
criticized to only be affordable for the government, successful
corporations and wealthy individuals.207 These services have
been labeled as a “service for the rich and a disservice for
justice.”208 The wealthy have an immediate advantage.209
Although many trial consultants will contend that their
goal is to select an impartial jury, the reality is that they are hired
by adversarial parties. And when one party rejects theories
well as rules that prohibit the attorney from violating rules through the act of a third party.”
Christina Marinakis, Is It Ethical to Research Jurors Online During Jury Selection,
LITIGATION INSIGHTS (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.litigationinsights.com/ethical-researchjurors-online/ [https://perma.cc/CX3L-L9N7]. While using a trial consultant to initiate a
contact is technically a violation, it is not clear how a violation can be detected or enforced.
204 N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012) (“Just as the internet and social
media appear to facilitate juror misconduct, the same tools have expanded an attorney’s
ability to conduct research on potential and sitting jurors, and clients now often expect
that attorneys will conduct such research. Indeed, standards of competence and diligence
may require doing everything reasonably possible to learn about the jurors who will sit
in judgment on a case.”). Although the NYC Bar opinion recognizes the usefulness of the
internet, it also limits social media and internet research to prevent impermissible ex
parte communications (no friend requests, no deception, etc.). Id.
205 Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 475.
206 Id.
207 See discussion supra Section I.B; see also Cleary, supra note 53, at 9; Strier
& Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 474.
208 Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 147.
209 “Trial consultants would likely counter this argument by noting that it is no
more unfair for the wealthier clients to hire more and better trial consultants than it is
for them to hire more and better attorneys and expert witnesses.” Strier & Shestowsky,
supra note 24, at 476.
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articulated by a trial consultant while the other party embraces
them, “the results are often lopsided.”210 Attorneys are obligated
to be resourceful as they zealously advocate for their clients, but
“at some point the cumulative effect of resource-based litigation
advantages available only to the wealthy must give pause.”211
Some judges have appointed trial consultants to indigent
defendants, but this is far from typical.212 Following the acquittal
of four white Los Angeles police officers pursuant to the Rodney
King beating,213 riots erupted in Los Angeles, and Reginald
Denny, a Caucasian truck driver, was pulled from his truck and
beaten.214 Denny’s attack gained national attention as millions
of viewers of live television watched him get “hit with a brick, a
tire iron and a fire extinguisher until he was beaten into
unconsciousness.”215 Two African American men were indicted
for attempted murder.216 A Los Angeles Superior Court judge
appointed Jo-Ellan Dimitrius, later recognized as O.J. Simpson’s
trial consultant, to represent the two defendants.217 The jury,
which was changed more than once since deliberations began,
acquitted the two men on most charges.218 The judge leveled the
playing field by providing the defense with a trial consultant,
but many courts hesitate to deem the hiring of trial consultants
“necessary to meet the requirement of effective assistance of
counsel.”219 Trial consultants can offer invaluable insight into
the jury selection phase, but the principal problem is that they
are currently performing work solely in an adversarial context.

Wedel, supra note 11, at 312.
Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 476.
212 “For example, in Spivey v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a trial
court’s refusal of an indigent defendant’s request for funds to hire an expert to assist in
jury selection, finding that the denial of funds did not violate the defendant’s ‘rights to due
process, equal protection of the laws, and effective assistance of counsel.’” Stolle et al., supra
note 53, at 170. Said simply, “most efforts by an indigent defendant to have the court
appoint a jury consultant on his behalf have failed.” See Hartje, supra note 10, at 503.
213 Jo-Ellan Dimitrius was the trial consultant in the Rodney King case,
representing the defense (the Los Angeles police officers) in both state and federal court.
See Adams & Kovaleski, supra note 6.
214 Jim Newton & Henry Weinstein, 3 Suspects Seized in Beating of Truck Driver
During Riot, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-13/news/mn1668_1_reginald-denny [https://perma.cc/4VWD-Q7D2].
215 Id.
216 See Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 169–70; see also Seth Mydans, Jury Acquits
2 on Most Charges in Beatings in Los Angeles Riots, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/19/us/jury-acquits-2-on-most-charges-in-beatings-in-losangeles-riots.html?pagewanted=2 [https://perma.cc/RZU9-CSDE].
217 See Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 169–70; see also Barber, supra note 26, at 1234.
218 Seth Mydans, Jury Acquits 2 on Most Charges in Beatings in Los Angeles Riots,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/19/us/jury-acquits-2-on-mostcharges-in-beatings-in-los-angeles-riots.html [https://perma.cc/RZU9-CSDE].
219 Stolle et al., supra note 53, at 170.
210
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ERADICATING TRIAL CONSULTANT BIAS AND ELICITING
JUROR BIAS

Said simply, the jury selection phase of a trial should not
be adversarial. “Trial consultants claim that their goal is to seat
less biased juries, juries that are more likely to deliver a fair
verdict.”220 In spite of this aspirational goal, trial consultants do
not work for the court; they are hired by the parties.221 To best
serve the interests of justice, trial consultants should assist in
the jury selection phase of a criminal trial by working directly
for the court. Not only will this eliminate the concerns that arise
from attorney-conducted voir dire, if a trial consultant is
employed solely by the court, the consultant will be more
motivated to fulfill the overarching goal of impartiality,
decreasing bias within the proceedings.
Jury selection should bear no resemblance to drafting a
sports team. The goal is not to empanel star jurors, yet the
current system enables, and even encourages, the adversarial
parties to recruit the best.222 As coaches exercise due diligence
before a draft, trial consultants gather data to determine the
types of people that will be most sympathetic toward their
client’s case.223 Not only does data collection sometimes interfere
with the jurors’ privacy, e.g. when conducted on the Internet, but
the objective is against the constitutional premise that
defendants are entitled to impartial juries.224 Therefore, trial
consultants should not be hired to offer services in connection to
jury selection in an adversarial context. Alternatively, if trial
consultants are employed by the court, they can focus exclusively
on the psychological reasons why a juror may be unfit to serve
on a particular panel.
Placing the duty on the courts to appoint trial consultants
will likely be met with some backlash. On the one hand, some
may argue that the court lacks the resources to employ a trial
consultant in every case. On the other hand, consultants with
high price tags will likely receive a large salary cut. In both
situations, the underlying concern involves money. When the
wrongful conviction rate in the United States is as high as it is,
however, money should not be the top concern.225 As mentioned
above, one explanation of wrongful convictions—including
220
221
222
223
224
225

Cleary, supra note 53, at 13 (emphasis added).
See Barber, supra note 26, at 1234.
See id. at 1227–28.
Barber, supra note 26, at 1227–28.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 178, at 1.
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convictions that sentence defendants to death—is that juries are
selected without the assistance of expert services.226 The jury
selection stage is critical, but its importance is being overlooked.
Meaningful change needs to be radical. Delegating jury selection
to a trained professional will enhance the system.
Trial consulting may revolutionize the way an American
courtroom functions, but the field must be significantly more
regulated to align with Batson and its progeny.227 Because trial
consultants are offering services grounded in psychology and the
law, there should be “professional qualifications and binding
ethical restrictions.”228 Trial consultants, as opposed to other
types of consultants, provide their expertise under vulnerable
circumstances. Unlike a consultant offering business advice, for
example, a trial consultant may be retained for a client facing
the death penalty. A state licensing body will not only protect
the credibility of the field, but more importantly it will protect
the public from retaining incompetent services.229
In 2016, one economist “testified to Congress . . . that the
argument for licensing ‘is strongest when low-quality practitioners
can potentially inflict serious harm, or when it is difficult for
consumers to evaluate provider quality beforehand.’”230 Trial
consultants fit the bill in both regards. First, if a trial consultant’s
client loses a case because the trial consultant failed to elicit the
biases among the jury pool, the client may serve jail time or be
sentenced to death. Second, despite the power of the consultant’s
advice, it is difficult for clients to evaluate a consultant’s quality
before the trial.
The state licensing body should demand that a person not
advertise as a trial consultant until they are licensed to do so.
Like any other state licensing scheme, there is a concern that
the state regulations may vary too significantly. Since the field
is still relatively young, however, the states will have the
opportunity “to learn from one another as they adopt and refine
Serio, supra note 177, at 1144.
See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (attorneys are prohibited
from striking a juror solely on account of the juror’s race); see also Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (Batson challenges apply in the civil context); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (Batson challenges can be made irrespective of the
defendant’s race); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55–56 (1992) (Batson challenges can be
raised against a criminal defendant, rather than just the State); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (Batson challenges may apply when a juror is eliminated on account
of his or her gender); Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (the noimpeachment rule does not bar judicial inquiry into racially charged jury deliberations).
228 See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 478.
229 See id. at 491–92.
230 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSES: RESEARCH, STATE POLICIES AND TRENDS 4 (2017).
226
227
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regulatory practices.”231 Although the states may develop
slightly different regulations, the overall licensing requirements
should resemble each other.
The licensing requirements should include educational
standards, including courses on the current legal landscape and
the social science behind jury selection. This will ensure that
consultants are selecting jurors without relying on the unfounded
prejudices articulated in Batson and its progeny. Scientific jury
selection should focus on the personal experiences that may render
a person impartial to a particular case, rather than a juror’s race
or gender. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a juror’s
immutable characteristics do not render the juror competent or
incompetent.232 The trainings will also emphasize the strategies to
elicit juror bias. Skilled trial consultants should be able to prevent
the juror misconduct highlighted in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado.
Clients relying on trial consultants should be confident that the
consultant is qualified to perform the services and is doing so in
accordance with Supreme Court precedent.
CONCLUSION
By removing the adversarial nature of jury selection and
implementing entry requirements in the trial consulting field, trial
consulting becomes a powerful tool in achieving an impartial jury.
This note asserts two solutions to resolve both the constitutional
and policy issues with the current system. First, one of the
overarching concerns about the jury selection phase is its
adversarial nature.233 The current system does not align with the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that all criminal defendants are
entitled to an impartial jury.234 Prosecutors and defense counsel
seek jurors that tilt the scales.235 By assigning court appointed trial
consultants to conduct this phase of the trial, the scales do not tilt.
Instead, the “appearance of justice” is restored because the
consultant no longer targets jurors receptive to one side.236
This practice will reduce abuse masked by peremptory
challenges and will eliminate the problem arising when only one
party can afford a professional trial consultant.237 That being said,
this recommendation does not affect the other services offered by
Id. at 15.
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Peña-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017).
233 Barber, supra note 26, at 1227–28.
234 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
235 Barber, supra note 26, at 1227–28.
236 Hartje, supra note 10, at 503.
237 See discussion supra Section III.C.
231
232
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trial consultants.238 Consultants offering advice about “courtroom
presentation and strategy” do not interfere with a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.239 This
proposed regulation therefore only applies during the jury
selection phase of the trial.
The second solution resolves an outstanding policy
problem. Trial consultants act as professionals in the legal and
psychology sectors, but the profession’s current entry
requirements do not demand the same level of proficiency that the
legal field nor the psychology field require.240 Consultants should
not base their analyses on speculative stereotypes and there
should be a stronger guarantee that they can efficiently elicit a
prospective juror’s biases. Indeed, trial consultants should be held
to quite a high standard. Implementing entry requirements
guaranteeing that consultants are skilled in the application of
psychology in legal proceedings ensures that the professionals are
competent to practice in a field where a person’s liberty may be at
stake.241 Trial consultants applying social science should remove
only those with objectively impartial experiences. If a statecertified trial consultant employed by the court conducts voir dire,
in the presence of the judge and the attorneys, and focuses on a
juror’s personal experiences or habits rather than his immutable
characteristics, the empaneled jury may actually be “impartial.”242
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